Pape why japan surrendered

You are commenting using your Twitter account. You are commenting using your Facebook account. Notify me of new comments via email. Notify me of new posts via email. Email Address:. Home About this blog and me. Herwig, Decisions for War, Academic book review: Charles Royster. Pape answers the question: Altogether, this means that the U. Bibliography Pape, Robert. Like this: Like Loading Leave a Reply Cancel reply Enter your comment here Please log in using one of these methods to post your comment:.

Matterhorndemanded excessive logistic support in Heavy bomberbases were quicklyprepared and the XXI Bomber Command began precisionbombing operations in November, continuing until early March Even this was a small effort, amountingto just 20 missions which dropped tons of bombs compared to the overalltotalof ,tons ultimately dropped on Japan,and 1,, tons dropped on Germany.

First,operationswere hindered by the long flyingdistances that restricted payloads to three tons out of the nominal ten, poor weather,Japanesefighter opposition, a sub-optimal ordnance mix of too many high explosives and too few incendiaries and, initially, a shortageof aircraft. Thus, littledamage was done. Out of Japan's nine principal aircraft engine and assembly plants, only three sufferedany lastingdamage. Production of aircraft engines had already fallen off sharply, and airframesslightly,in the last two months of , In addition, the quality of Japan's the plants were struckby Bs.

Gary J. Craven and Cate, The Pacific,p. Two additional major B missions were sent against Iwo Jima as well as some minorraids against both Iwo Jimaand Truk.

The Matterhorntargetdirectivehad included aircraft production,steel, ball bearings, electronics, and merchantshipping. In practice,however,only steel offered significant targets within range of the U. Craven and Cate, ThePacific, pp.

Craven and Cate, The Pacific, pp. For example, output at the Ota aircraft plant had fallen froma peak of per month to less than before the plant was firstattacked in February.

Allocation of aluminum to the industryhad declined 70 percent by the firstquarter of Craven and Cate, The Pacific, p. For instance, aircraft availabilityrates fell from80 percentat the beginningof the war to 20 percent,while 40 percent of non-combatferrying flightsresulted in losses.

Startingwith the fireraid against Tokyo on March 9, , the American strategicbombing effort shiftedfroman interdiction strategyto a Douhet strategy based on inflicting maximumdamage on population centers. An ideal interdiction strategywould pinpoint key war industriesand raw materials,while an ideal Douhet strategy would simply blot out residential and commercial areas of whole cities. Interdiction missions would be flownin daylightformaximumaccuracyand at high altitudeto avoid air defenses,while Douhet missions,requiring lesser accuracy,could be flownat nightwhen air defenseswould be weaker.

Finally, while bombloads for both types of missions might include a mix of high explosives and incendiarybombs, Douhet strikeswould employ a higher proportionof incendiaries. Hansell, to adopt area incendiary bombing.

Test incendiary raids were ordered as early as Cohen, Japan'sEconomy, pp. The primaryreason that chemical and biological weapons were not used was strongopposition by the British. Churchillfearedthatuse of gas against Japanwould encourage German gas attacks against Britain. In , the United States agreed not to initiatethe use of gas or retaliateunilaterally withoutpriorconsent by the British.

Sigal, Fighting to a Finish,p. The high explosive bombs would break up structures so thatthe incendiariescould set the pieces on fire. Since homes are normallymore flammablethan factories or the industrialequipment in them, fewer high explosives are needed for residentialarea bombing. For a detailed account of the development of Americanincendiarytactics,see JohnW. Mountcastle,"Trial by Fire:U.

IncendiaryWeapons, " Durham, N. Shandroff,"Evolution of Area Bombing," pp. November 11, , before the firststrikeshad been flown. LeMay, who had commanded the Bs in India, and was known as an advocate of nightincendiaryattacks. This raid remains the most devastating air attack in history,exceeding even the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even so, LeMay managed to send two major fire raids against Tokyo, which burned away another 22 square miles. Attentionwas then turned to secondary cities with populations over , , and 58 of 62 were burned.

The war ended. The firstfireraids were flown against Tokyo on November 29 and Nagoya on January3. Shandroff, "Evolution of Area Bombing," p. Tactics forthe fireraids were designed to incinerateJapanese cities most effectively.

Since precision accuracy would be unnecessary, missions were flown at night. In addition, LeMay developed a set of special tactics to reduce fuel requirementsand enable the planes to carry heavier payloads. First,since the Japanese had very littleshort-and medium-rangeflak, the bombers flew at very low altitudes 5, instead of the usual 20, feet. Second, because Japanhad no real night-fighter capability, bombers could attackindividuallyinstead of flying in and carryno armament.

Craven and Cate, ThePacific, formation, pp. Army WarfareServices Washington,D. Twenty-twomillion people, 30 percent of Japan's entire population, were rendered homeless. These more than exceeded Japan's combat casualties in the Pacificof approximately , The finaldecision to drop the atomicbombs was takenby PresidentTruman followingJapan's rejection of the Potsdam Proclamationon July28, Hiroshimawas bombed on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9.

Some 80, died at Hiroshima and the citywas leveled; at Nagasaki 35, died and part of the citywas destroyed. This can be measured in two respects: morale or shock effect, and the additional damage and suffering inflicted on the population. Due to the Surprisingly, news of the bombings Japanese government'stightcontrolof information, spread only slowly and the war ended beforemuch of the population learned The best shortoverview of the urban area attacksis Craven and Cate, ThePacific, chap.

The degree to which the Douhet strategy was executed is oftenunappreciated. One reason may be that politicalleaders understatedits magnitude in memoirs,and media coverage at the time largelyneglected the counter-city campaign. Both Churchilland Truman hardlymention the conventionalattacksand, when they do, they give the impressionthatcounter-city attacks had just gotten under way when the war ended.

Likewise, press reportsduring the war paid scant attentionto the incendiarycampaign against Japanese civilians. Sherry,Rise ofAmerican Air Power,pp. OfficialJapanese figures, based on unscientific data collectionand reporting procedures,were considerablylower , totalciviliancasualties. Nagasaki suffered less because the citystood among a numberof hills that shadowed large parts of the cityfromthe blast.

Figures forboth cities do not include deaths due to long-term radiationeffects. The Strategic Bombing Survey later estimated that damage equivalent to that caused by both atomic bombs could have been matched by B sorties using fourtimesthatmany sorties incendiaries;XXI Bomber Command was flying everyweek by August First, they should have been employed to threatenvast futuredamage, ratherthan to maximize currentdamage. Second, the time between detonations should have been long enough to allow the bomb's importto sink in, and forthe Japanese to reconsiderwhetherto accede to American demands.

Neitherof these criteria were met. The first could not be met,because the firebombings had already inflictedsuch tremendous damage. By the time the atomic bombs fell, a vast portion of the urban population had either become casualties or had fled to the countryside. By the end of the war, Japan's 66 largest cities had become shadows of theirpre-war selves; those w4ith over , had lost 58 percent of their populations, and those If one definesthe "hostage" as major with over a millionhad lost two-thirds.

Few people outside the targetareas had any real comprehensionof what the atomicbombs meant. USSBS argues thatmorale effects of both conventionaland atomic bombingwere similarin that those closest to the blast were affectedsubstantially more than those not in the immediate on Japanese vicinity.

More than 10 millionJapanese, one sevenththe nationalpopulation and one fourth of urban dwellers, fled to farmsforrefuge. Thomas R. Withoutmany more bombs-perhaps dozens-that the United States did not have, atomicbombing certainly could not have overshadowed the effects of incendiaryattacks.

These targets would have been quickly used up, forcingthe atomic campaign to turn to smaller cities where its advantage over conventional bombing would have been smaller. The timingrequirement was also not satisfied.

Since the Schellingstrategy aims to coerce by increasing futurerisks, it is necessary to permitthe opponent to assess those risksand act accordingly. However, the second atom bomb was dropped only three days afterthe first, time for barely sufficient the Japanese governmentto carryout a quick investigationof the effects of a wholly revolutionaryweapon, and not enough to develop a reasoned assessment of the danger it presented. Despite these weaknesses, the atomic bombings mighthave been an effectiveSchelling strategy, providingthatthe Japanese did not guess thatthe United States had no morebombs.

This strategy usually depends on signaling fairly clearlythe scale of punishmentthat the attackerintends to inflict, but the coercivepotentialof the atomicbomb depended preciselyon the factthat the Japanese had no way of knowinghow much destruction would be visited upon them. Having no way to estimatehow many bombs were in the U.

In fall , the timetableforending the war against Japanwas disruptedby events in Europe, when it became clear that the collapse of Germany was not imminent. Since the invasions of Kyushu and especially Honshu depended on redeploymentof large numbers of troops fromEurope, which would require fourto six months, plans forthese operations had to put on hold. Hence, during the winterand spring of , air and sea operations In fact,no more bombs were on hand at the end of the war and only two were produced by the end of The final debate over the timing of the invasion took place following Germany'scollapse in May The Navy and ArmyAirForces stillobjected to invasion.

The reasoning behind the decision was contained in a JCS staffstudy and fuel, it which argued that while the Japanese home armylacked aircraft had 2 million men plentifully supplied with ammunitionand powerfuldiscut offfromthe Asian mainland, her cipline. Although Japan was virtually food supplies were thoughtto be adequate at least through So, despite the close blockade and intense bombardmentof Japan, the JCS "doubted whetherthe general economic deterioration had yet reached, or would reach forsome time, the point at which it would affect the abilityof the nation to or repel an invasion.

With some misgivings, Truman accepted the JCS recommendationalthough, according to Secretaryof War Henry Stimson: "He had hoped there was a possibilityof preventingan Okinawa fromone end of Japan to the other. Ray S. Departmentof the Army, , pp. HerbertFeis, TheAtomic Bomb,pp. King and W. Kirby,Surrender ofJapan, p. Stimson,quoted in Feis, TheAtomic Bomb,p. Kirby,Surrender ofJapan,p. No formaldirectivefor Coronet was ever issued by the JCS,since Japansurrenderedwell in advance of the startof Olympic.

Planningforthisoperation during the summer and fall of involved more logisticsthan strategy-more about how to redeploy large numbers of Army formations fromEurope than about how to employ them in the Japanese theater. June,was the capture of Okinawa, withoutwhich American tacticalaircraft could not reach Kyushu. The plan for Kyushu had three phases. First, strategicair bombardmentwould continue the destructionof Japanese industrial power and communications.

Next, the southern part of Kyushu would be isolated fromthe rest of the island, the mainland, and Honshu by a close naval blockade and tactical air interdiction.

Finally, fourteenU. Army and Marine divisions would commence an assault against the estimated Japanese divisions defendingsouthernKyushu. Although air interdiction contributed little,the naval blockade had achieved most of its military objectivesby the end of , makinginevitableJapan'seconomic collapse in The Douhet strategy was implementedquite effectively fromits inceptionin March , largely depopulating Japan's cities by August.

While it could not be carriedout beforeNovember, the invasion strategy was highlycredible, especially after the fall of Okinawa in June provided the necessary forwardbases. For its part, the atomicbomb contributed littleto the Douhet but could have been effective as a Schellingstrategy, strategy, depending on Japanese estimates of the size of the U.

Explaining Japan'sDecisionto Surrender In order to determinewhether it was military or civilian vulnerability that played the decisive role in Japan's decision to surrender,first,we must understand how the Japanese governmentmade consequential decisions.

Second, we need to know Japan's politicalobjectivesin the Pacificwar, and her military and diplomatic strategiesforachieving them. Finally,we must measure the relationshipbetween the increasing vulnerabilitiesof Japan's and changes in Japanese leaders' population and of her militarystrategy, willingnessto surrender. If the campaign took longer than 30 days, U.

Because the Japanese constitutionprovided that a cabinet could not be formedwithouta War minister and Navy minister, the military also had effective veto power over all government actions.

Of the two branches, the Army was by far dominant. In addition, the formation of the Kwantung Armyafter the seizure ofManchuriain gave the Armyan instrument whollybeyond centralcontrol. The Navy was much weaker, but did have the advantage over the civilians in that it had the and skills to raise an occasional credible dissent to the information military Army. The second group was the civilian leadership, which included the senior statesmenservingin the cabinet,some ofwhom were retired military officers, and the emperor's chief adviser, the Lord PrivySeal Kido.

This group had the formalresponsibility forrunningthe country, but in practicedid not act Theirmost important function againstthe wishes of the military. Although the emperor did However, while there is good evidence forthe major coalitions,we do not have sufficient evidence forall individuals to treateach as a separate case. For descriptionsof the oligarchicaland consensual nature of Japanese governmentduring this period, see RobertJ. Last was EmperorHirohito,who served primarily as a religioussymbolto unifythe national consciousness of the country.

Although in principle he had the power to make law, in practicehe tookno formal partin government, except that cabinet decisions were required to be reportedto him.

In theory,national policy decisions were made according to a rule of unanimous consent. The cabinet, which combined the Army and civilian groups, worked out a decision and then presented it to the emperor,who never departed fromit. In practice,this did not work because of the Army's overwhelmingdominance. The Armycontrolledthe military police, a prime instrument forrepressionof dissent.

For instance,in April War Minister Anami ordered the arrestof some persons suspected of harboringendthe-warsentiments,including a former ambassador to England and a judge of high rank. Japan's main territorial goals in the Second WorldWar were drivenby a need for economic and military autarky.

Japan sought to controlthe major agriculturaland raw materials-producing areas of East and Southeast Asia, including Manchuria, much of China, and the Dutch East Indies. This perimeter, they beit to accept Japan's lieved, would defyU.

This strategy enjoyed some success untilthe Japanese triedto extend Butow, Japan'sDecisionto Surrender, p. Because Anami refrained fromsubmitting his resignation, the Suzuki Cabinet was able to attainits major goal, namely,the war's termination.

The Philippines, Malaya, and Burma all had some economic value, but were attacked for strategic reasons. Barnhart, Prepares forTotalWar,pp. Japan For a recentdiscussion of how Westerneconomic coercionbackfired, see Jonathan G. During the second phase, Japan fought a defensive war, seeking to "hold the ring" in the central and southern Pacific in order to present the United States with the prospect of a long-drawn-outwar and thus induce it to abandon its counteroffensive.

Following the loss of Guadalcanal, New Guinea, the Marshalls, and the Marianas, it became clear to most Japanese elites thatJapan could not achieve the originalobjectivesforwhich she had waged war against the United States in the first place.

The cabinet of General Hideki Tojo, which had begun the war, felland was replaced by a new governmentheaded by PremierKuniaki Koiso. Japan especially hoped to end the war with her most important mainland possessions intact.

An indicationof the commitmentsJapan stillbelieved itselfcapable of defendingcan be gained fromthe September cabinet discussions about the concessions Japanwould have to offerthe USSR to "mediate" between Japan and the United States.

Kirby,Surrender ofJapan,pp. Although some of the Jushinhad begun to doubt Japan's abilityto maintain controlover her newly acquired territories as early as , the fallof Tojo was the first real opportunity to change Japan's fundamentalpolicy. China, Sweden, and Britain were also approached as possible intermediaries,with no result. The fourthand final stage began with the U. Koiso felland was replaced by AdmiralKantaro Suzuki.

Suzuki's cabinet, however, was not formedto produce a negotiated settlement. Although the Japanese expected that after Okinawa the Americans would invade the home islands, this did not trigger a decision to open surrender negotiations. To the contrary, the Army,the emperor,and Suzuki himself believed thatJapan's best strategy an intensebattleon the home was to fight islands ratherthan accept surrender.

This plan had two tracks. The first was an approach to the Soviet Union, beginningin June,in search of diplomaticor military aid. Japanese leaders were divided over the goals of Soviet mediation.

For the civilians, the purpose was to get help in encouraging the United States to reduce its surrender terms. For the military, which was not interestedin the purpose was to ensure Japan's abilityto continue the war. In surrender, in return particular, theysought to purchase Soviet oil and aircraft forSoutheast Asian rubber, tin, lead, and tungsten or, if necessary, for territorial concessions.

At best, some in the Navy hoped eventuallyto draw the Soviet Union into the war on Japan's side. At a minimum,theywanted to prevent a Soviet attack. Because of the lack of consensus, contact with the Soviets was not pursued with any sense of urgency or with a consistent set of In any case, the Soviets were unresponsive.

In April , the Japanese militarybegan planning for homeland defense. They estimatedthat the United States would invade Kyushu with divisions and Honshu with approximately 30 divisions. While invasion mightcome as earlyas July, it was considered more likelythat the United States would not be prepared to attackKyushu until October 1. Statementsby some Japanese officials to the effect thatJapan first approached the Soviets in February are erroneous, according to Butow, Japan'sDecisionto Surrender, p.

Detwiler and Charles B. According to General Shuichi Miyazaki, Chief of the Operations Bureau, the Army "hoped to concentrateits strengthentirelyin the area where the American forceswould make theirfirst landing, and it hoped to strikea decisive blow, therebyforcingthe enemy to abandon [its] intention of attempting a second landing or else seriouslydelay this move.

Operationally,the American assault would be counteredby large conventionalforcespositionedin and near the likelylanding areas, while guerrilla forcescovered lower-priority regions. Accordingly, southern Kyushu and the Tokyo area were allottedmore than half of the 67 divisions and 35 independent brigades available, while provision was made for rapid reinforcement of the initialinvasion area.

For inits fifteen stance, should Kyushu be attacked first, divisions would be augmented with threeothersfromHonshu. Given Japan's mountainous terrain, the possible landing beaches were well demarcated. These beaches were to be heavilyfortified withobstacles,mines, and entrenchedtroopsand artillery emplacements.

If possible, the invaders were to be defeated on the beaches; otherwise mobile assault divisions would counter-attack and destroy the beachheads. Because of a dearth of trained pilots and aviation fuel, in inflicting kamikaze tacticswere expected to be more effective losses than standard types of air operations. Kirby,Surrender ofJapan, pp. Quoted in Sigal, Fighting to a Finish,p. Kamikaze air strength actuallytotaled more than 4, To evaluate the relativeeffects of civilianand military vulnerability on Japan's decision to surrender, we must trace the effects of changes in vulnerabilities on the positions of the major groups in the Japanese governmentregarding surrender.

To do this, the case is divided into a number of discrete time slices, and the degree ofJapan's vulnerability to each typeof threat-nuclear, conventionalfireattack, and invasion-is measured for each period.

If the preferencesof one group changed at the same time as an increase in one type of vulnerability, while the other type remained constant, this would show thatthe first and not the second was the cause of thatgroup's decision. Carrying out this analysis reveals that the only factorto influence, all principalgroups was Japan's military vulnerability to invasion. Japan's vulnerability to nuclear attack had some influenceon some groups but not on the Army,the criticalgroup.

The vulnerability of Japanese civilians to conventional attackhad hardlyany effect on any decision makers. The two independent variables are civilianvulnerability and military vulnerability. Civilian vulnerability is coded as "low" where civiliancosts were not sufficient to meritthe costs of civiliandefense procedures,"medium" where large civilian costs could be avoided with defensive steps, "high" where major parts of the population are uncertainabout whethertheywill survive even with defenses, or "very high" where major parts of the population are certainnot to survive because avoiding the enemy's attacksis impossible.

Measurement of military focuses on the home islands, bevulnerability cause controlof her national homeland was the most importantvalue that Japan was being called upon to surrender. Vulnerability is coded as "low" where therewas no riskof the home islands being overrunin the shortterm, "medium" where the risk was considerable but could be reduced by added defensivemeasures, "high" where the risksof losing were great despite the best available countermeasures, but thatit mightbe possible to inflict enough attritionto reduce the enemy's commitmentto control the territory, and "very high" where the likelihood of loss of control over the territory approached certainty because both defeat and heavy attrition of enemy forces are impossible.

BeforeJune , Japanese societywas not vulnerable to attack. Prior to June Japan was never bombed, except for the fifteen-plane Doolittle raid of April During this period, From June to November , vulnerability China-based Bs bombed Japan on several occasions, but only a few cities light. Although thousands of civilians were killed or injured, protectivemeasures such as air defenses, evacuations, and firelanes cut throughcityneighborhoods helped keep costs and riskslow.

For example, the relativeineffectiveincendiaryraids convinced the Japanese thattheir ness of earlyexperimental fire-prevention systemswere highlyefficient.

The massive AfterMarch , however, civilian vulnerability high levels of casualties which Japanese Americanincendiaryraids inflicted reduce.

Currentcosts and riskswere higherthan those fromincendiaryattack. The initialatomic not significantly raids, certainly bombs were not much more lethal than the largestincendiary increase in lethalitythat has come to be not by the orders-of-magnitude major incenassociated with hydrogenbombs.

More people died in the first diaryraid on Tokyo than at Hiroshima. Despite this,the ultimaterisksfaced time forthe United States by Japan had escalated markedly.

Given sufficient to nuclear attackwas unlimited. Some civilianleaders were immediately could not sustain this new formof warfare,while some Army and Navy representativesdenied that an atomic bomb had been used at Hiroshima.

Havens, ValleyofDarkness, p. Craven and Cate, ThePacific,. Not untilAugust 10, afterthe Nagasaki bombing,did the investigators finally agree thatJapan faced the prospect of an enemy now equipped with atomic power. Priorto July, military vulnerability was nil. Japan's strategyfor holding the defensive perimeterin the Pacifichad not yet been decisivelydefeated. Japanese leaders stillhoped thatat some point escalating losses would deter the United States fromcontinuingthe war, allowing Japan to keep its territorial gains.

Beginningin July, with the fallof the Marianas, military vulnerability rose, although it remained low. The Marianas were the first positions to fall in Japan's inner defensiveperimeter, and the battleforthe islands destroyed much of her remainingnaval power. As a resultof this defeatTojo's cabinet fell. Japan was clearlylosing the war, and invasion of the home islands had to be considered as a remote possibility.

Also by this date, submarines had strippedJapanof much of the shipping needed to continuea protracted war. In April , militaryvulnerability increased to medium with the U. With all importsof raw materialsblocked and stockpileslargelyconsumed, production in key war industrieshad fallen25 to 50 percentor more. While the militaryrecognized the risk of an invasion by powerful American forces, theybelieved thatJapan stillretained sufficient resources to make Ketsu-Go effective.

Withthe morale advantage offighting on home soil, Japaneseforces would be capable of defeatingthe attackers. In addition, therewas-stillhope that the Soviets would provide diplomaticand military assistance, although they had announced on April 5 that they would not renew the RussoJapanese NeutralityPact when it expired in April The connectionwith the Asian mainland was now completely Ketsu-Go.

A reportby Butow, Japan'sDecisionto Surrender, pp. Imperial General Headquarters argued that a decisive battle on Japan's shores would end in victory forJapan. For a similarAmerican appraisal, see Sigal, Fighting to a Finish,p. Under these conditions,it was clear thatJapancould not prepareforKetsuGo as fullyas was expected in April. In particular,the kamikaze units would be unable to cope with the demands of an invasion.

At about the same time, General Yoshijiro Umezu, chief of staffof the Army,was forced to admit that the in preparingeven basic defenses Armywas encounteringserious difficulties forthe Tokyo plain. Lieutenant General Seizo Arisue, chief of the Army's IntelligenceBureau, said, "If we could defeat the enemy in Kyushu or inflict tremendouslosses, forcing him to realize the strongfighting spiritof theJapaneseArmyand people, it would be possible, we hoped, to bringabout the termination of hostilitieson comparativelyfavorableterms.

The Soviet offensiverupturedJapanese vulnerability lines immediately,and rapidly penetrated deep into the rear.

Under these circumstancesit was obvious that the invasion would findJapan without means forprolonged resistance,and that even if it were initiallyrepelled, disintegration of the entire economy would occur in a short time. General Shuichi Miyazaki was somewhat less confident,saying that victory"was beyond all expectation. The best we could hope for[was to inflict] a majorblow on the enemy.

For an excellent history,see David M. ArmyCommand and General StaffCollege, As a resultofJapan's depleted abilityto execute Ketsu-Go,it was not likely that U. Contemporary American analyses estimated that conquering Kyushu would cost about 20, Allied lives. Americanplanners were stillmore optimistic about takingHonshu, which they estimated would cost 15, lives, presumably because they expected that the battleforKyushu would consume the last of Japan's war production.

Access options available:. Why Japan Surrendered Robert A. Pape T h e end of World War I1 in the Pacific is the most successful case of military coercion among modern nation-states. On August 15, , Japan unconditionally surrendered to the United States, although it still possessed a two-million-man army in the home islands which was prepared and willing to meet any American invasion, as well as other forces overseas.

This coercive success saved the lives of tens of thousands of Allied soldiers and many more Japanese. The key question is: why did Japan capitulate before invasion and decisive defeat of her home army? Debate has raged for decades over this question. This prolific literature offers three principal explanations, all of which assume that civilian vulnerability was the key to coercion.

It was the experience of what an atomic bomb will actually do to a community, plus the dread of many more, Robert P a p is an assistai7t professor the Schoul of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.